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ABSTRACT
The inquiry in hand deals with the political thought of a religio-political party—the Jamm’iyyat Ulama-i-Pakistan (JUP) which once contributed to safeguard the very ideology of the country by timely sensing the subsequent sway of Socialism or Communism as well as Command Enlightened Moderation. The different positions analyzed deal with the real questions of state and society construction as per aspirations of JUP. As a result one can gauge the political as well as ethical preferences of this religio-political party with greater accuracy. More importantly, through systematic comparison, one gets a clear and coherent view of the vision and thought pattern of a specific mindset of a group of scholars and politicians through political activities of the JUP. The period selected is the representative one of the functioning of this religio-political party.

KEYWORDS
Religio-political Landscape; Dynamics of Politics; Socialism; Command Enlightened Moderation; Religious Right; Constitutionalism.

1.1. MECHANICS AND DYNAMICS OF POLITICS IN PAKISTAN: GAME OF IDEALS AND REALITY
The prevailing political System in Pakistan, in its composition, is a network of individuals, groups and organizations whose interactions and relationships, in turn, help determine, enforce and interpret the rules and policies governing the behaviour of a society. It mainly encompasses the state institutions, such as legislatures, courts or administrative agencies. As a matter of fact every political system exists within a social system. The society behaves like an environment for the political system to function smoothly. A political system generally involves the political structures
(the government bodies, political parties, pressure groups, etc.), the political roles performed by the agents of the political structures, the patterns of interaction between the agents and their norms and traditions, values and attitudes, (called the political culture and the public opinion), and lastly, the political processes including the exercise of the public opinion in order to keep the political culture intact and sustainable. The political system as structural functional subsystem of the society interacts as a system of inputs, processes and outputs, in which the demands of the people act as an input, forming the base of public opinion (the veneered role of the electorates arises from this phenomenon); while the inputs are processed in the form of the public opinion or the will of the people through their values attitudes and beliefs, leading to the development of the political culture. Finally, the government materializes the popular public demands in the form of its policies as an output of the political system. It derives its resources solely and discretely from the society in order to rise up to the aspirations and expectations of the people.

The society, as an environment to the political system, has both complex and complicated nature. It includes a number of political and social subsystems. The main political subsystems are the political parties, interest or pressure groups, etc, while the social subsystems are the families; religious groups; cultural associations; educational institutions; commercial, industrial and other economic organizations. In the long run, all these political and social subsystems provide base for the formation of public or electorates’ opinion to be exercised as a will in the electoral process. Resultantly, as per structure and nature, the political system of a country revolves around the people and the instructions written in the consecrated document of the Constitution.

2. Conceptual Framework

Dialectics of religion and politics in Pakistan is one of the hottest themes under discussion right from the inception of the country. The study in hand, addresses itself to analyse the role of a religio-political party—the Jam’iyyat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) on the level of ideology in right-left stratum prevalent in the politics of religion; its activism and policies in order to counter communist and so called “liberal”, better called liberal fascist as well as hegemony of “command enlightened moderation” to be considered a serious intimidation to the establishment of an Islamic welfare state—the coveted ideal Jinnah dreamed, preached and struggled hard to materialize it. The JUP following the founding father Muhammad Ali Jinnah’ aspirations to create it out of the present political panorama struggled hard within and out of the Parliament could furnish some prescriptive measures meant to solve various problems facing Pakistan if it got the chance to assume power. Most of the studies on the religion and politics in Pakistan deal with it on abstract level. The effort is usually to capture the philosophical bases from which it emanates. How abstract notions, ensconced in philosophical jargon relate to concrete, tangible social relations is often lost in such analyses. Previous studies on Islamic political parties have concentrated on typical political parties in descriptive manners, revolving around their historical perspective and chronological annals in a plain and naïve setting. They encompassed the thought of some individuals or studied the thought and activities of particular organizations or approached it as a political bargaining process among several actors in the country’s political setting.

Before discussing the religion-politics interplay in the context of JUP’s Rightism, it is necessary to share a brief overview of its functioning for the convenience for those readers who did not come
across the activism of small religio-political parties which not only strived hard for their survival but also fought for the change of system abiding by country’s constitution. It will cover its formation and an early interplay with the parties present on the political spectrum in Pakistan. It is pertinent to note that Jam‘iyyat Ulama-i-Pakistan, comprising ulema from Barelvi faction—subsect of Sunni Hanafi School of Thought, was the first religious party which came into existence after the establishment of Pakistan. Till June 1970, it worked mainly as a religious party and supported ruling elites on various political issues. In the wake of 1970 general elections, the leadership of JUP redesigned its role and launched it as a religio-political party in order to take part in country’s politics to implement its party programme if it got a chance to assume or share power.7

Prior to the party’s formation, the Barelvi leadership had supported All-India Muslim League, and after Pakistan’s creation, it continued supporting Muslim League and Muhammad Ali Jinnah for greater Islamization in the new state. Failing to achieve this, it created the JUP for the “enforcement of Shariah as a confirmation and recognition of the Prophet and his deeds”. The party’s manifesto calls for implementation of the Quran and Sunnah, with courts enforcing Shariah.8

3. EVOLUTION OF RELIGIO-POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN PAKISTAN

The need for the Islamic democratic system was felt right after the emergence of Pakistan, a country which came into existence through a purely democratic movement through the exercise of the will of the electorates in 1945-46 General Elections in the subcontinent. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah emphasized on the very need of a constitution for the nascent state. He remained absorbed to find the solution of the preliminary problems; naturally no attention could be paid to the task of drafting constitution. That’s why the matter of constitution making was delayed. The situation was further aggravated with the death of Quaid-i-Azam. After a long delay Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan was able to get the Objective Resolution passed by Constituent Assembly on March 12, 1949. The Objective Resolution is one of the important documents in the constitutional history of Pakistan. However, this process again went slow with the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. His successors failed to maintain the pace Liaquat once set forth. The dirty power game and the petty interests of the politicians hardened the way of constitution making. Especially debate on the nature of the constitution whether it would be Islamic or secular, not only bifurcated the nation but gave rise to many problems like provincialism and regionalism etc.9

Right from the inception of the country, the religious as well as religious-cum-political parties came forward with an aim to realize the government authorities that the state was established in the name of Islam. Hence these forces kept every regime under continuous pressure to make and implement Islamic constitution as per aspiration of the common masses. Intriguingly, the interplay of religion and politics got some on-paper achievements in the form of the Objectives Resolution 1949 and inclusion of Islamic provisions as ‘directive principles’ in all the three Constitutions of 1956, 1962 and 1973; but they had no state power to get them implemented. To the dismay of the Religio-political Right the slow process of constitution making took nine years to reach the first regular constitution of Pakistan.10 Although the constitution could not satisfy all the quarters yet it provided a smooth base for further development. Pakistan was practicing a political system without any prior experience. The inherited acts were of colonial nature and were designed to fulfil the
needs of the colonial masters of the subcontinent. Therefore, the problems raised were inevitable. The politicians could not run the country according to the democratic norms and made the constitution of 1956 a total failure. In reality it was not the constitution that failed it was the designs of the politicians that destined to its failure that led the country to Martial Law. Delay in the holding of elections in the country under the constitution provided the undemocratic forces a golden opportunity to concentrate the powers in their hands and exploit the resources of the country to reassert the new colonial rule in the country and to play with the fate of the people. The solution to a bad democracy is not the suspension of the democratic process rather it lies in supplant of a newer democracy and allow it to settle and let it pass through the process of evolution and refinement. But time and again interruption in the democratic process by undemocratic forces resulted in weak democratic institutions.\(^{11}\)

4. JUP- RISE AND CONSOLIDATION AS RELIGIOUS RIGHT

After independence, the religious scholars of Barelvi school of thought who supported the two-nation theory came forward to establish a religio-political party—the JUP, in order to struggle for a modern progressive state as per Jinnah’s aspirations. The founders of the JUP not only worked for the consolidation of the foundations of the state, but also played their due role in the constitution making process right from the inception of the JUP. The JUP leadership even drafted an outline for an Islamic Constitution to be considered and handed its copy over to M.A. Jinnah. The efforts of JUP and religio-political parties bore fruit in 1949 when they registered their first success in the form of the Objectives Resolution, followed by the incorporation and provision of some Islamic clauses in the 1956 Constitution.\(^{12}\) However, to the disappointment of the ulama this achievement in black and white could not be ever materialized and same was the fate of the 1962 Constitution. General Ayub Khan, the originator of the Constitution, instead of inculcating the demands of the ulama, incorporated family laws and established the Council of Islamic Ideology in order to update the knowledge of the religious scholars in the fields of Islamic teachings on modern lines. The representation of Ayub’s favoured religious scholars was generally resented by the ulama. However, ulama’s credibility in the eyes of electorates was tested in the very first general elections of 1970. The JUP performed comparatively better, especially against the PPP which was the representative of the leftists flocked under its umbrella and came forward to implement their designs. The stormy election campaign, especially the holding of Toba Tek Singh Kissan (Peasant) Conference and declaration of the city as ‘Leningrad’ was an eye-opener for the rightist forces of the country, especially for the JUP which right from its inception had realized it as a ‘threat’ and was destined to cope with it. However, after the 1970 election results, although it was the runner up in the West Pakistan in the face of awesome PPP success but had not enough political force to ensure electoral victory. Hence, it adopted the policy of forging opposition alliances in order to ponder the rightist political power; moreover, it had to cope with, or on the other extreme, to accommodate both the leftist and rightist alliances, but without compromising on its cherished political norms and values.\(^{13}\) However, the JUP earned on its credit an extraordinary feature that it emerged as a “Constitutional Right” and confined its political activities within the folds of the Constitution. Its efforts for the Constitution making process cannot be underrated in view of the Islamic demands. Its personal achievement was the inclusion of the ‘definition’ of a Muslim into the 1973 Constitution. Resultantly, the 1973 Constitution contained more Islamic provisions than the preceding two, and it was the marvellous achievement of the religious right that Islam was
declared as the ‘State Religion’ in the Constitution. On the purely religious front, the religious right predominantly solved the issue of the finality of the prophet-hood and ensured a constitutional cover for it in 1974.\textsuperscript{14} This understanding among the religious parties gave way to the formation of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), a conglomeration of likeminded religio-political parties on the moot of the JUP; it posed a real challenge to the leftist Bhutto, who in turn, managed to rig the second General Elections of 1977. Reaction of the rightist parties was severe enough to remove Bhutto from the power corridors but the PNA move invited the third force to intervene, which in turn overturned the political chess for the next eleven years or so. The JUP’s main leadership stayed away from the political ambitions of General Zia. However, the latter managed to create rifts among the JUP ranks and lured a considerable portion of JUP by accommodating them into his so called national government.\textsuperscript{15} The JUP, on the other hand, launched moots and worked for restoration of democracy and for this purpose forged a number of political alliances in union with likeminded religio-political parties, including Tehrik Tahaffuz-i-Pakistan (Movement for the Solidarity of Pakistan), Pakistan People’s Alliance (PPA) and in the longer run the most effective alliance Mutahidda Majlis-i-Amal (MMA). The JUP, not only faced the leftist designs of the Bhutto, but also faced the atrociousness of the Martial Law regimes with different programmes to keep the politicians away from the political arena. The prime time of JUP’s rightism was the Musharraf regime when it effectively coped with the command ‘Enlightened Moderation’ of the regime.\textsuperscript{16}

After going through the interplay of religion and politics in Pakistan one can safely come to the conclusion that the failure on the part of the religious and political elites was not the failure of Islam to act as an integrating force in order to solve the country’s problems; especially the model, JUP manifests is moderate and progressive enough to be implemented but due to both the complex and the complicated nature of the existing political system the chances of the rightists to come into power and in turn implement their programmes are diminishing. The JUP’s religio-political struggle during the period of study in hand underlines an outstanding fact that it promoted the ‘politics of principles’ by categorically contradicting with obnoxious trend of ‘politics on principles.

5. JUP- AN INTERESTING EPISODE OF RISE AND POLITICAL DISMAY

Since the 1980s, due to both internal differences and external interference, the JUP although has lost much of its relevance and is divided into several splinter groups yet it strived hard to survive and sustain within country politics through waging electoral and political alliances in due course of time. In 1970 General Elections, the JUP won more seats than the Jama’at-i-Islami (JI) and as many as the Jam’iyyat Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) in the National Assembly. It also won the largest number of seats in Sindh after the PPP. Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, one of the JUP’s stalwarts and party chairman (1970-2003) is credited with playing a key role “in preparing and evolving a consensus on the 1973 constitution”. He was, however, unable to build a robust party apparatus and to mobilize Barelvi constituencies effectively, although the majority of Pakistanis belong to this Sunni sub-sect. As a result, he failed to consistently translate public support into electoral success.\textsuperscript{17}

Zia’s eleven-year rule rendered the JUP almost insignificant. The party staunchly opposed military rule, due in part to its pro-democracy stance, but also because of Zia’s espousal of Wahhabi Islam.
Nor did the JUP support the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. According to party members, Zia provoked its internal rifts in order to minimize its impact, including by inviting some members to join his Majlis-i-Shura and promising them lands in return for their support. JUP members even argue that the MQM’s creation was primarily meant to corrode the JUP, rather than the JI vote bank in the urban centres of Sindh, like Karachi and Hyderabad. As a matter of fact, the MQM did indeed eclipse an already diminishing party.\(^{18}\)

The party’s ideological differences with Saudi Arabia also heralded an uphill fight for survival, as Saudi funding for Wahhabi-influenced political parties and sectarian groups dramatically altered Pakistan’s sectarian landscape. During the Gulf Crisis of 1991, Maulana Noorani announced his support for Saddam Hussein (1937-2006), largely due to his opposition to the Saudis, but this stance had little impact on the standing of a party that had by then largely lost its relevance, within the context of both national and Islamic politics. The JUP’s suspicions of Saudi influence in Pakistan continue today.

The JUP split over a disagreement during a 1990 by-election in Lahore about the party’s relationship with the PML-N. As a result, Noorani’s faction joined the Pakistan Awami Itehad, while another JUP leader, Maulana Abdul Sattar Niazi, led a faction that chose to ally with Sharif and the military-created alliance, the Islami Jamhuri Itehad (IJI). Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani’s death in 2003 was followed by an internal leadership tussle from which the party has yet to recover. Today, his faction of the JUP remains a skeleton organization, with no written position on matters of foreign, economic or domestic policy, limiting its political involvement to occasional statements on religious issues.\(^{19}\)

The major hindrances in the way of developing a good democratic system in Pakistan can be termed as crises revolving around the identity, legitimacy, integration, penetration, participation, and distribution, etc. which in turn created a number of problems ranging from regional to national level.

**6. CONCLUSION: SCALING AND GAUGING THE RISE AND FALL OF JUP**

The rise and fall of JUP can be grasped into a number of stages at abstract level including estimation of all the issues regarding the interplay of the religion and politics through a number of phases during which the Jam‘iyyat Ulama-i-Pakistan (JUP) performed its due role, especially in the left-right milieu encompassing the transition from colonialism to independence (1947-54); era of multiparty system and politics of coalition civilian – military bureaucratism (1954-58); first martial Law and the transformation of the bureaucratic state into a military regime, coupled with issuance of Basic Democracies (1958-69) as well as raise a number of research questions whose answers make the very foundations for the forthcoming chapters to be developed upon:

1. If Pakistan was created on basis of the Islamic Ideology, why the people of the country ruled out the arrival of religious leaders into the power corridors?

2. Why the slogan of ‘Islamization’ is time and again raised by the religious leaders, if Pakistan is in essence an Islamic country and people are religious so what else do the ulema want?

3. If constitutions of 1956, 1962 and the 1973 were very much Islamic in their spirit, so what new things do the ulema want to introduce?
4. Is the game played in the name of religion and politics a creative or a destructive one for the state? Considering the positive side of the game, can the ulema bring betterment both for people and for the country?

5. Should Pakistan be considered an “enlightened” and “moderate” modern Muslim nation, as President Musharraf suggests, or do we face an Islamic State whose ideological foundation and moral-legal disposition militates against Western values?

On continuum; a gist of JUP’s strife as a well-established ‘Constitutional Right’ for the making of agreed constitution with Islamic spirit for the country is also one of the episodes to be discussed. During 1970-1974, JUP not only participated in the 1970 General Elections and attained a good voice at the Assembly Floor but also tried to appease people’s aspirations regarding different constitutional and political issues. JUP’s endeavour was satisfactory one in a way that during the period the 1973 Constitution based on national consensus was promulgated and subsequently the Qadiani Issue was resolved through the inclusion of the definition of a ‘Muslim’ through the Second Amendment to it in 1974. JUP’s efforts on both floors of the Parliament for the social reformation are the core themes which direct the study further and provide details of JUP’s dialectics with the emerging powerful socialist as well as communist trends led by Bhutto’s populism, (1971-77), and established the foundations of JUP’s popular strategy of forging alliances in order to advance its political struggle and maintaining its presence as per its self-designed and self-ordained political ambitions and motives. The high-handedness of the Tehrik-i-Nizam-i-Mustafa posed a number of lessons to learn for the JUP and it changed its policy to forge alliances and never sat with those political forces into the alliances which betrayed or in the long run sided with the hegemonies of totalitarianism which intervened as per its own timing and programme. Hence, its leadership stayed away from the military’s ‘B’ teams in all the four Martial Laws the country faced to date. Then comes the effective role the JUP played during the 1990s in bringing sectarian harmony in the country. In the long run this harmony developed among the religious right through the efforts of JUP led into a religio-political alliance—MMA in order to face Musharraf’s ‘Enlightened Moderation’, considering it a ‘command performance’ in the wake of US-led War Against Terrorism (WAT), and it was for the first time in the country’s history that the religious right got a tremendous victory in 2002 elections; also how the establishment of the country got rid of this ‘panic’ is the interesting episode. Once again, the JUP raised an effective voice especially on Musharraf’s Military Uniform Issue and its hard-line adopted in the face of atrociousness of the regime is a unique chapter of the country’s political history. JUP’s manifesto, interestingly, is one of the progressive manifestoes in the face of JUP’s quest for an Islamic welfare state. The minor political parties share one commonality with the major parties, as the political conditions of the country suggest, is the paucity of capable leadership. The JUP, like almost all the other parties of the country did not manage to train politicians to fill the vacuum created after the acquittal or demise of top leadership which led to its ‘withering’ away in the due course of time.

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